The Problem with God in a World of Suffering: The Classical Solution

A close-minded materialist wrote another bashing of religion for our local newspaper, one of fifty or more over the last twenty years. This time he returned to a familiar subject, the problem of evil in our world, a favorite of atheists since the time of Epicurus. Simply put, a loving and powerful God would be expected to protect his children from evil and suffering in all its forms, but God obviously doesn’t. So either God is impotent or unconcerned, or God doesn’t exist at all. Either way, we are left to fend for ourselves, and the fending is always difficult, often harrowing, and ultimately tragic, with death having the final say.  That is the problem we all face.

I grant him the truism that suffering engulfs us all. Everywhere there is disorder that needs cleaning up. Our kids get sick, our credit debt is getting out of control or we get hacked, we look at the war news that offers no end, we lose our temper and scream at our spouse or best friend, and the Dodgers even get swept in four games. And this is nothing compared to the real tragedies that play out in places like Sudan, Venezuela, Lebanon, or hospitals where innocent children die of cancer. The world is on fire with suffering of every kind.

Wouldn’t it be wonderful if these things never happened. And if God cared, if God acted like a loving parent instead of an absent parent, they wouldn’t. This is an understandable and even noble concern–one that led to the collapse of my theistic Christian faith many years ago. I feel compassion for the writer; I have traveled down that same road. But I have come back to God. 

Here is the reasoning that led me back. If you eliminate suffering from human experience, you are left with nothing of importance worth doing. Consider what drives us to do our best—to work hard at our jobs, to sacrifice leisure in our homes, to resist temptation in its many guises.  It all comes down to fixing the things that need fixing, things in our environment, things in ourselves. Fixing is not fun. It takes work, self-control, and very often suffering. 

Now consider a different world, one in which we never have to suffer. Most of us know what that is like if we’ve spent a week at the beach. It becomes boring.  We might complain of Monday morning, but consider a life in which there are no Monday mornings. What would we do? Fun gets old after a while. 

God is not interested in making our lives comfortable, stress-free, and painless.  On the contrary, God has designed a world in which we must use our free will, limited intelligence, and physical strength to survive. Without being tested, we would get lazy and worthless even to ourselves. We would also become bored. 

Most importantly, we would not grow morally and spiritually. Compassion, kindness, patience, unselfishness, resilience, courage, dedication to duty, forgiveness, and humility could never be formed. These are virtues born of struggle, travail, and sometimes conflict. They don’t come easy, but they mature us into good people, sometimes even great people. The philosopher John Hick, whose book Evil and the God of Love is the most complete study of the problem I’ve come across, puts it this way:  “It would seem, then, that an environment intended to make possible the growth in free beings of the finest characteristics of personal life must have a good deal in common with our present world.”

Even the entertainment we enjoy points to this conclusion. What is the subject of the movies we enjoy? We are fascinated by scenes of injustice, crime, violence, and its resolution. The sports we enjoy expose us to disappointment and even anger, but we take the risk anyway. Imagine a jacuzzi world in which nothing went against us and no one suffered. 

We are made for sterner stuff. We are energized by and driven to do our best in a world like ours, and in the process we grow in character, grow our souls, and ready ourselves for the next world and even more growth. This is what God is interested in. 

Do you thank God for happy outcomes? That is a good practice. Just as good is to thank God for the chance to fail.

Stafford Betty, Professor of Religious Studies, CSUB, (ret) is the author of When Did You Ever Become Less by Dying? and Heaven and Hell Unveiled. His novels include The Imprisoned Splendor, The Afterlife Therapist and Guardians of the Afterworld. His latest book, The Hell Dwellers: A Novel about the Dark Side of the Afterlife is published by White Crow Books. Stafford can be found at staffordbetty.com.

Comments

  1. Well stated, Stafford. The skeptics also ask why, if God is so powerful, He doesn’t do a better job of revealing Himself. Of course, if He did, it would no doubt affect our free-will choices and we would likely have many more suicides than we have now.

  2. Life is already too easy for many in the West, especially Americans, who don’t have enough to do. I recall how unresentfully busy my mother was washing clothes before she had a washing machine. The importance of physical labor is unappreciated in our modern world. When done well, it gives satisfaction and builds character. If more work was required, there wouldn’t be time for endless hours online or nonstop video games. I wonder if our nearly insane dependence on technology will be our undoing. Warnings abound that our cushy lifestyle could be fatally wrecked by cyber-criminals in places like Russia and North Korea, not to mention AI gone rogue. It’s hard enough living through the aftermath of a hurricane without electricity for a week. Imagine a month!

  3. The very last thing I would want in this life is a God that would shield me from pain, adversity and sorrow. I would learn nothing from it, void all chance of gaining real knowledge in the next life, and forfeit my own free will. Coal becomes diamonds through pressure. So do we. Thank you, Professor Betty. Very well said.

    1. To Ed, Hans, and Larry, thank you for sharing your views with us. Interestingly different, each stated clearly and worth considering alongside each other. Stafford

  4. Dear Stafford, I always love what you write about. But I personally do not share your explanation about God and suffering. What I’m about to share in my reply I cannot prove and neither is it my intention to convince anybody: I do not believe that God (Love, Energy, Source etc.) would want His children to suffer – because that is contrary to His essence which is Love. I also don’t believe that God needs to experience His magnificence and potential through His children, because God is already all-powerful, all-knowing and all-present. Our suffering is totally self-inflicted through our consistent ego-will which caused the ‘Fall of Angels’ eons ago and by which we entered the temporary reality of time and space, realm of contrasts and cause and effect. None of this exists in the Absolute divine Reality (the permanent NOW) from where we all came as perfect spirit beings. Our divine existence in the Absolut Reality was far from ‘boring’. On the contrary the highest form of Love is service. And here the higher evolved beings serve the lower evolved beings and Vica verse in accordance to God’s will. The Absolute Reality – our true Home – is the realm of bliss and joy where consciousness (God spirit) continuously morphs Itself into a multitude of phenomena (stars, planets, life forms etc.) in ever expanding universes. And there is a lot to do for all divine spirit beings (which we all are in our essence). I have made two short videos about this – if anybody is interested. As I said in the beginning: I merely offer this information in my videos for those who might be interested. https://youtu.be/3LzhpC-O1zQ?si=1yaFiJbbkMZ5Vr8L and https://youtu.be/_gKgLRabGeU?si=EIuhJOMioiFzATqs

  5. I think this is a partial answer, but it doesn’t cover two important areas: 1) animal suffering, which has gone on for hundreds of millions of years before we even got here (the discussion always seems limited to human suffering); and 2) instances of suffering that have no potential to learn or teach, at least without invoking reincarnation (e.g., infants starving to death, people buried alive in mudslides, etc.).

    For me, these problems are intractable and are not explained by the “character building” defense (which I do take seriously). I’ve had to abandon the traditional notion of an omni God because of them. It just doesn’t add up that a God who was all wise, all powerful, all benevolent, all knowing, etc., would create suffering on such a massive scale (both numbers and time), just to build some human character.

    Instead, I’m coming to believe in an evolving God, a God who is not “omni” everything, and who (through us) struggles to grow, despite all the suffering and horror. “Evolutionary panentheism” is the term I have heard used for it. It is, imo, better on the problem of evil and suffering than the traditional notion of omni God.

    It currently makes the most sense for me. I say “currently,” because my concept of God has changed pretty drastically over the years, and since I’ve still got a few years left, it may change some more.

  6. Stafford: While Henry Ward Beecher famously said “I never had a sorrow that I could spare”, supporting the argument of suffering as a path of growth, Ed makes a good point about the various afflictions and predations that nature has undergone over the ages.

    A few of the guises that evil comes in are:

    Moral evil — cruelty, war, greed, indifference — what we do to one another.
Natural evil — earthquake, disease, predation, decay — suffering that comes not from malice but from the way the physical world works.
Metaphysical evil — the limitation of all finite, unfinished beings.
    Structural evil, harm built into the systems we inherit and sustain together, even without intending it.

    But good and evil also seem to be two sides of the same coin. Every so-called good has an evil twin that must be guarded against. Take fossil fuels. Their harnessing powered the Industrial Revolution, and with it modern science, medicine, transport, and commerce — freeing human beings, in large measure, from mere muscle power and local scarcity. Yet that same stored energy, released rapidly and without restraint, brings untold environmental destruction. The coal and oil are not evil. The power is real, and genuinely good. Its twin appears when the power is used in excess, at the wrong scale, and for selfish ends, before we have learned stewardship.

    Is that not true more generally? Fire warms and cooks, and burns. Knowledge heals, and weaponizes. Wealth relieves poverty, and tempts to greed. The evil is not a separate substance created alongside the good. It is the same capacity, unguarded.

    Might there therefore be another category, what I would call evol — not a finished evil, but evolution misread as completion? Perhaps much earthly evil is consequent upon planetary evolution still underway?

    The same movements that raise mountains and renew soil produce earthquakes. Geological evolution stored the carbon that industrial evolution later released. And humankind is still evolving spiritually. We acquire power far faster than we acquire wisdom. Moral evil, on this view, is the friction of that gap — immature beings handling mature powers.

    If that is so, suffering is not good in itself, and this does not explain every particular horror. But it changes the problem. The atheist argument assumes a finished world judged at an intermediate moment. If creation is instead a process, and we are inside it, then what we call evil may be less a contradiction of a loving God than evidence that neither the earth nor we ourselves have arrived — and that learning to guard the good against its twin is itself the soul-making work.

  7. Dear Stafford,

    I think there is considerable merit in the soul-making argument you’ve developed in response to the problem of evil. Suffering, adversity, and the constraints of earthly existence can provide powerful occasions for moral and spiritual development, encouraging the cultivation of qualities that might otherwise remain dormant or insufficiently developed. Physical incarnation may function as something of a forcing house for spiritual growth, where the pressures and exigencies of embodied existence bring particular possibilities of development into sharper focus. Nevertheless, there is an important distinction between acknowledging the formative possibilities of suffering and concluding that suffering is universally necessary, much less that every particular instance of suffering can be justified by its developmental consequences. Indeed, as I suggested in my earlier comment concerning discarnate progression [see under Stafford’s blog post of 15 Oct 2026], one of the persistent features of the literature of ostensible communications from the deceased is that spiritual development continues beyond death, frequently under conditions of considerably greater happiness, freedom, and fulfillment than those ordinarily encountered on Earth. This suggests that adversity may be an important occasion for spiritual growth without being its indispensable foundation.

    I wonder, therefore, whether we might approach the problem from a somewhat different direction, not simply by considering what purposes suffering may serve, but by examining the nature of evil itself and the larger constitution of Reality within which evil becomes possible. In particular, I think two considerations deserve attention: first, the intrinsic differentiation associated with manifested existence, and second, the existence of an underlying moral order by reference to which evil becomes recognizable as evil. The two are closely related, although they address quite different aspects of the problem.

    We might begin with the simple observation that existence, as we experience it, is intrinsically multiple and differentiated. The manifested world consists of innumerable beings, conditions, relationships, and possibilities, distinguished from one another by their particular natures, capacities, limitations, and circumstances. Whatever our metaphysical understanding of this multiplicity, its existence is immediately evident. Within the traditional metaphysical understanding represented by Plato, Plotinus, and the Perennial Philosophy more generally, however, multiplicity is not simply an inexplicable given. It represents the procession or effulgence of the Divine into the manifold possibilities of manifestation, the expression within differentiated existence of possibilities grounded ultimately in the Divine Source.

    Ananda Coomaraswamy develops a particularly suggestive account of this in his essay, “Who Is ‘Satan’ and Where Is ‘Hell’?” He observes that a manifested world characterized by space, time, and becoming necessarily involves distinction, opposition, and contraries. A world of multiplicity cannot possess the undifferentiated unity of its ultimate Source, and the manifestation of diverse possibilities entails corresponding differences, limitations, and relations of opposition. These are not arbitrary defects subsequently introduced into an otherwise undifferentiated creation, but belong to the constitution of manifestation itself. Coomaraswamy consequently argues that the existence of contraries cannot be treated as though it were some inexplicable departure from the very nature of manifested existence.

    An important qualification is required, however. Differentiation is not itself evil, nor does every limitation constitute a privation in any morally significant sense. A being may possess the capacities appropriate to its particular nature without possessing those proper to another kind or order of being. Likewise, an individual may occupy a perfectly appropriate stage of development without yet having realized the greater possibilities that subsequent maturation may disclose. The distinction is between the ordinary limitations intrinsic to differentiated existence and the deprivation, corruption, or obstruction of goodness properly belonging to a being. Nevertheless, multiplicity and differentiation establish the conditions under which conflict, deficiency, frustration, and suffering can become possible. The potentiality of evil may therefore be understood as intrinsic to the structure of manifestation without supposing that evil itself, or any particular instance of evil, is a necessary consequence of that structure.

    This helps illuminate what philosophers have sometimes distinguished as metaphysical and natural evil. The former concerns the limitations and imperfections associated with finite existence, although, as just noted, finitude should not automatically be identified with genuine privation. The latter concerns suffering arising through the conditions and processes of the natural world, independently of deliberate wrongdoing. A differentiated physical order, characterized by interacting beings and processes, vulnerability, change, and corruption, provides the setting in which such suffering can occur. This does not establish that every particular natural evil is necessary, nor does it explain why suffering should occur in the particular forms, circumstances, or degrees that we encounter. But it does suggest that the possibility of natural evil is intelligible in relation to the constitution of manifested existence itself, rather than requiring the introduction of some independent principle of evil.

    Multiplicity, however, encompasses more than differentiated physical beings and circumstances. It also includes particular centers of consciousness, individuated beings possessing their own perspectives, concerns, dispositions, and capacities for action. Within a metaphysical understanding in which consciousness itself is ultimately grounded in the Divine, these individuals may be understood as finite particularizations of a more encompassing Consciousness, exercising their own limited powers of initiative within their respective fields of existence. Among those powers is the relative freedom of the individual will. Such freedom is certainly not absolute. It is conditioned, sometimes severely, by circumstances, knowledge, temperament, habit, embodiment, and the limitations of consciousness itself. Nevertheless, within those conditions there appears to be a meaningful capacity for orientation and choice.

    Here the differentiation inherent in multiplicity acquires an additional significance, for the existence of relatively free centers of consciousness introduces the possibility of moral evil. The individual may direct consciousness, intention, and action toward understanding, love, goodness, and communion, or toward possessiveness, cruelty, domination, hatred, and spiritual self-enclosure. The powers through which these possibilities are exercised are themselves positive capacities, but their exercise admits of misdirection and disorder. Moral evil thus becomes possible through the misuse of agency without requiring evil to possess some independent creative power or metaphysical substance of its own. The freedom that makes possible an individual’s conscious participation in the Good also permits a contrary orientation, although the possibility of such misorientation does not imply its inevitability.

    These considerations do not resolve the entire problem of evil, but they do provide a preliminary answer to one aspect of it. They indicate how the possibility of evil arises within the conditions of differentiated manifestation, whether through the limitations and vulnerabilities of finite existence or through the relative freedom of individuated consciousness. Evil need not be understood as an inexplicable intrusion into creation, nor need its possibility imply the existence of an independent principle standing in metaphysical opposition to the Divine. Yet having established how evil can become possible, we encounter what seems to me a deeper and perhaps more fundamental question. What is it, precisely, that enables us to recognize evil as evil in the first place?

    The familiar argument from evil generally proceeds from the recognition that existence contains suffering, cruelty, injustice, and other conditions that appear incompatible with the existence of an ultimately good and omnipotent God. But the force of the argument depends upon something that often goes insufficiently examined: our apprehension that these conditions are genuinely evil, rather than merely unpleasant, inconvenient, or contrary to our preferences. We do not ordinarily regard an act of gratuitous cruelty simply as something we happen to dislike. We apprehend it as something that ought not to be, as a violation of a goodness possessing an authority beyond our immediate desires or interests. The experience of conscience, and the profound moral injury that can follow its violation, suggest that our apprehension of moral obligation is not readily reduced to a calculation of personal or collective advantage.

    This presents a substantial difficulty for any understanding of Reality that regards the universe as fundamentally devoid of objective moral order. If the distinction between good and evil is ultimately nothing more than a matter of subjective preference, evolutionary conditioning, or social convention, then the assertion that existence is objectively defective because it contains evil becomes difficult to sustain. We may certainly dislike the circumstances of existence, or wish that they were otherwise, but the moral authority of the objection is no longer self-evident. To condemn an aspect of Reality as genuinely evil is to invoke a standard of goodness by which Reality is judged. If that condemnation is intended to possess objective force and authority, the grounding of the standard itself becomes a question that cannot simply be bypassed.

    This does not mean that our apprehension of moral obligation automatically proves the existence of God, or that the philosophical grounding of objective morality is a simple matter. But it does suggest that the question underlying the problem of evil may not be merely why evil exists. More fundamentally, we must ask whether Reality possesses an intrinsic moral constitution through which evil can be recognized, evaluated, and ultimately overcome. Our apprehension of goodness and moral obligation may itself be a disclosure, however imperfect, of an order of Reality that is not morally indifferent. And if this is so, the distinction between good and evil acquires a significance extending considerably beyond the preferences and judgments of individual human beings.

    Here the metaphysical understanding of the Good, as developed in the Platonic and Neoplatonic traditions, becomes particularly illuminating. The Good is not conceived merely as one desirable quality among others, nor simply as a moral attribute possessed by a supremely powerful personal being. It is understood as the ultimate source and ground of existence itself, intimately associated with the True, the Beautiful, and the Real. Goodness is consequently not an extrinsic standard imposed upon an otherwise morally indifferent universe, but belongs to the very foundation of Reality. The moral order apprehended through conscience may therefore be understood as an expression, within finite consciousness, of an order whose ultimate foundation transcends the individual.

    From this perspective, the classical doctrine of evil as privation becomes especially significant. Developed by Plotinus and subsequently by Augustine, it denies that good and evil are two independent metaphysical principles possessing equivalent standing. Goodness is ontologically primary, while evil is derivative, representing a deprivation, distortion, corruption, or obstruction of goodness and the fuller realization of being. A privation is intelligible only in relation to the positive reality whose proper presence or fulfillment is lacking. Darkness, to use the familiar analogy, is understood through the absence of light; blindness through the deprivation of sight. Likewise, moral disorder becomes intelligible through its departure from a goodness to which consciousness and action are properly ordered.

    This does not render evil imaginary or inconsequential. A deprivation may be devastatingly real in its effects upon beings who experience it, even though it possesses no independent metaphysical substance. The corruption of something genuinely good may be a profound evil precisely because the goodness corrupted is real. Nor should we suppose that every degree of difference or limitation constitutes a privation. The crucial question is whether some goodness properly belonging to a being has been obstructed, diminished, or lost. Properly understood, the doctrine does not deny the reality of suffering or wrongdoing, but situates their reality within a larger order in which the Good, rather than evil, possesses ontological primacy.

    We can now see how the considerations concerning multiplicity and moral order begin to converge. Differentiation provides the conditions under which privation becomes possible, including the possibility of moral misorientation through the exercise of relative freedom. But it is the ontological primacy of the Good that makes such privation intelligible as a departure from what properly ought to be. The Good is both the source of the positive capacities manifested within existence and the measure by reference to which their corruption or impairment becomes recognizable. Evil is thus real within the differentiated conditions of manifestation without being ultimate in the constitution of Reality.

    Plotinus develops this understanding in a manner that is particularly suggestive for our present purposes. At the opening of Ennead V.1.1, he asks what has caused souls to forget their Divine origin and their own true nature. He associates this estrangement with self-will, the desire for separate existence, and the soul’s fascination with its apparently independent activity. The soul’s movement toward self-enclosure becomes simultaneously a movement toward ignorance of its source. What appears initially as an assertion of freedom may consequently produce a diminution of freedom in a deeper spiritual sense, as the soul becomes increasingly confined within the limitations of its own separative orientation.

    Even more remarkable is his treatment of the subject in Ennead I.8.13, where he describes the soul’s descent through vice toward radical privation, employing the imagery of darkness, mud, and the ‘region of unlikeness’. He speaks of a condition resembling spiritual death, and explicitly extends his description beyond physical death, portraying the soul as remaining immersed in its impoverished condition until it can somehow turn away from that immersion and raise its awareness toward a higher possibility. The passage is extraordinary not merely because of its metaphysical implications, but because its imagery possesses an unmistakably experiential, and indeed postmortem, character.

    It is precisely here that I find a remarkable correspondence with the literature of ostensible discarnate communications. Across a substantial body of testimony concerning the conditions of existence beyond physical death, we repeatedly encounter descriptions in which the experienced possibilities of spiritual existence appear intimately related to the inward moral and spiritual condition of consciousness. The relationship is expressed not simply in terms of happiness or unhappiness, but through the very qualities and capacities of the world the individual inhabits.

    Descriptions of profoundly unhappy or degraded spiritual conditions frequently involve diminished illumination, restricted perception, confinement, limitations upon movement, impoverished imaginative and creative capacities, disordered or ugly surroundings, and isolation from meaningful communion with others. Conversely, descriptions of happier and more developed conditions are associated with increasing light, beauty, freedom, understanding, love, communion, and creative power. These correspondences extend across numerous dimensions of reported experience, suggesting a relationship between the individual’s inward condition and the scope and character of the Reality accessible to that individual.

    What particularly interests me is that these conditions are not generally represented as the consequences of an externally administered system of divine reward and punishment. Rather, the individual’s own condition of consciousness appears to be intrinsically related to the possibilities of existence that can be experienced and realized. Spiritual and moral condition, on this understanding, is not merely judged within the cosmos; it participates in determining the character of the cosmos as experienced by the individual. The order is intrinsic rather than merely judicial.

    The correspondence with the Plotinian understanding of privation is, I think, striking. What the metaphysical tradition describes as a diminution of participation in the Good appears to find a concrete experiential counterpart in the restricted possibilities of consciousness and existence reported in the lower spiritual conditions. Conversely, increasing spiritual realization is accompanied by greater illumination, beauty, freedom, communion, and the effective exercise of creative and imaginative capacities. The relationship between goodness and the fullness of Reality thus appears not merely as a philosophical abstraction, but as something expressed through the reported conditions of spiritual existence itself.

    Here, however, an important distinction must be preserved. Not every limitation encountered in discarnate existence should be understood as a manifestation of moral evil, or even of pathological privation. The literature describes a hierarchical order of differing degrees and modes of spiritual development, and the mere fact that an individual has not yet realized greater possibilities does not imply that the individual’s present condition is morally defective. A soul may occupy an appropriate stage of development while possessing only a portion of the capacities and understanding that subsequent maturation may disclose. Ordinary spiritual incompleteness is not equivalent to evil.

    Nor should every unhappy or impoverished spiritual condition be attributed to culpable wrongdoing. The testimony includes individuals whose capacities appear profoundly restricted through confusion, ignorance, fear, trauma, or suffering that cannot reasonably be reduced to moral failure. Such cases are especially important because they remind us that privation, understood as a restriction upon the possibilities of existence, need not imply moral culpability on the part of the individual experiencing it. The metaphysical character of a condition and the moral responsibility of the person who suffers it are distinct questions.

    This brings us to another important feature of the testimony: the character of spiritual progression itself. Here I think we should distinguish two closely related, but not identical, movements. The first is the ordinary maturation of the soul, through which unrealized possibilities of consciousness and being are progressively developed. The second is the corrective restoration of a soul whose spiritual capacities have become impaired or restricted through some form of estrangement, disorder, or privation.

    The distinction is consequential. Accounts of the happier spiritual realms describe continuing advancement through understanding, learning, service, love, beauty, creative activity, and increasingly comprehensive participation in a larger spiritual life. Such progression need not presuppose wrongdoing or the necessity of suffering. It may simply represent the natural unfolding of possibilities inherent in the soul, as finite consciousness progressively realizes capacities and relationships that were previously beyond its reach. Spiritual development is thus not fundamentally a struggle against evil. It is a positive movement toward fuller participation in the Good, of which the overcoming of evil is only one particular aspect.

    A different, though related, movement is involved where the individual has become imprisoned within some condition of spiritual misorientation or privation. Here progress requires not merely the unfolding of further potentialities but the overcoming of impediments that restrict capacities otherwise capable of realization. The soul must, in some measure, reorient its consciousness and will, relinquishing the dispositions, attachments, or misunderstandings that sustain its impoverished condition. Yet this does not mean that the individual must accomplish such restoration unaided. Indeed, one of the most persistent features of the discarnate testimony is the compassionate assistance offered by more developed beings to those occupying unhappy or restricted conditions.

    The role of relative freedom becomes especially important in this connection. Spiritual transformation cannot simply be imposed from without, as though an individual might be transported into a higher condition and thereby acquire the consciousness necessary to participate in it. Some corresponding inward transformation must occur. Nevertheless, the individual’s capacity for such participation may itself be profoundly impaired, and the assistance of others may be necessary to awaken the understanding, receptivity, or aspiration through which further progress becomes possible. The individual is neither an entirely autonomous agent of self-liberation nor a passive recipient of externally conferred salvation. Spiritual restoration appears to involve the interaction of personal participation and compassionate assistance within an intrinsically moral order of existence.

    Here again we encounter a correspondence with Plotinus’s account of spiritual return. The movement away from estrangement is simultaneously a movement toward fuller participation in the Good. And there is a suggestive paradox in the role of freedom: the misdirection of the will can result in progressive spiritual confinement, whereas its proper orientation, supported by the assistance of others, opens the possibility of ever-greater freedom. The overcoming of privation and the realization of positive spiritual potentiality are thus complementary, although distinguishable, aspects of spiritual progression.

    The broader implication is that the Good is not merely the standard by which evil is recognized, nor simply the ultimate object toward which spiritual beings strive. It is also operative through the possibilities of maturation, compassion, assistance, and restoration by which consciousness advances toward fuller realization. The moral constitution of Reality is consequently not exhausted by the distinction between reward and punishment, or even between virtue and vice. It is expressed through the intrinsic relationship between goodness and the enlargement of the possibilities of existence itself.

    Of course, the literature of ostensible discarnate communications must be approached with appropriate epistemic caution. The authenticity of particular accounts remains open to assessment, and recurring correspondences among sources cannot always be regarded as independent corroboration. Cultural influence, inherited religious assumptions, and speculative elaboration must also be considered. Nevertheless, the extent and coherence of the reported relationship between inward spiritual condition and the qualities of experienced existence seem to me worthy of serious attention, particularly in light of their correspondence with the metaphysical understanding we’ve been considering.

    Nor do I suggest that this account constitutes a complete solution to the problem of evil. It does not explain why every particular instance of suffering occurs, why suffering is so unevenly distributed, or why innocent beings sometimes endure circumstances of such terrible severity. The metaphysical possibility of evil does not entail the necessity of its actuality, and the possibility of spiritual restoration does not retrospectively justify the suffering that made restoration necessary. These questions retain their full moral seriousness. Indeed, an understanding of Reality grounded in the Good should make us more, rather than less, attentive to the genuine evils encountered within it.

    Yet I think the understanding offers something more comprehensive than the soul-making argument considered by itself. It suggests that suffering and evil are neither inexplicable intrusions into manifested existence nor indispensable instruments of spiritual development. Their possibility arises within the differentiated conditions of manifestation and the relative freedom of finite consciousness, while their character as evils becomes intelligible through an underlying order of goodness. Spiritual development, meanwhile, is not fundamentally dependent upon their existence. It is an intrinsic movement of finite consciousness toward the increasingly comprehensive realization of the Good, within which the overcoming of privation constitutes one important, but by no means exhaustive, aspect of the journey.

    And this leads me to a final consideration concerning the ultimate character of Reality. Is the cosmic drama fundamentally tragic, or is it, in the deeper literary and metaphysical sense, a comedy? Dante’s Divine Comedy provides the familiar paradigm of a movement through darkness, estrangement, and suffering toward illumination and ultimate fulfillment. Comedy, in this sense, does not signify the absence of tragedy or suffering within the unfolding narrative, but concerns the direction and final character of the whole. The journey is understood not merely through the conditions encountered along the way, however terrible they may be, but through the possibility of their transcendence in an ultimate realization of the Good.

    There is, moreover, an interesting distinction between Dante’s cosmology and the prevailing tendency of the discarnate testimony. Whereas Dante’s Inferno presents conditions of damnation as final, the discarnate literature generally describes even profoundly unhappy spiritual conditions as potentially open to transformation and advancement. This does not establish that every soul must ultimately attain complete spiritual realization, nor that the eventual destiny of every individual is assured. But it does suggest a cosmos in which the possibility of restoration extends far beyond the apparent finality of earthly suffering and death, and in which the movement toward the Good remains a living possibility even under conditions of severe spiritual deprivation.

    The problem of evil thus appears within a considerably larger metaphysical horizon. We need not deny evil, diminish its seriousness, or attempt to justify every particular suffering in order to understand that it may nevertheless lack ultimate sovereignty over existence. Differentiation makes evil possible, relative freedom permits moral misorientation, and the experience of conscience raises the question of an objective goodness by which evil is recognized. The metaphysics of privation situates evil within an order in which the Good remains ontologically primary, while the discarnate testimony suggests that the possibilities of spiritual existence themselves reflect that moral constitution, permitting both the ordinary maturation of souls and the progressive overcoming of estrangement and privation.

    In such an understanding, the fundamental movement of existence is not toward the triumph of evil or the final absurdity of suffering, but toward fuller participation in the Good, which is intimately related to the Beautiful, the True, and the Real. The Good is not merely the hoped-for outcome of the journey. It is the source, measure, and ultimate orientation of the journey itself. And perhaps this offers the deepest response to the problem you’ve raised: not that suffering can invariably be justified as a necessary instrument of spiritual education, but that evil, however real and terrible, may be understood within a larger Reality whose foundational character, and whose deepest possibilities of realization, are intrinsically good.

    Best,

    Paul

    1. This long essay, grounded in the spiritual philosophy of Plotinus, will be challenging reading for all on this list. For those of you wondering what it has to do with the afterlife, hang in there. Midway through the essay, “Paul” launches into that question. “It is precisely here,” he writes, “that I find a remarkable correspondence with the literature of ostensible discarnate communications.” Paul moves from deep metaphysical truth-seeking to its relation to the discarnate literature we are all familiar with, at which point the full grandeur and clarity of the essay will switch on like an unexpected light.

      In his long comments over the last two years, Paul has emerged as a teacher. He has deepened my understanding of the meaning of life and the part that evil plays in it. Most importantly for those of us who worry about how God could permit such evil, he has made the divine project, or what we call our world, in both its material and astral expressions, a momentous journey in soul-rescue and soul-building.

  8. Your posts are very interesting… I discovered that during the First World War, the medium James Padgett claimed to be in communication with Jesus. Attached is a message from Jesus regarding the war raging in Europe…
    https://thepadgettmessages.net/padgett-messages/jesus-teaches-he-will-not-come-again-as-prince-michael/
    There will arise no Satan to fight against me or my followers in the sense that the preacher teaches, for besides, the fact that I am already in world fighting for the salvation of men, there is no Satan.

  9. It seems to me unlikely that Jesus, the founder of the world’s greatest and largest religion, would speak through Padgett or anyone else. I sense a disproportion between the two. I would also be suspicious of an alleged message from Mohamed or the Buddha or Moses or Confucius. It’s too easy and tempting to claim authenticity for a message that comes from one of these world-making beings. I am not accusing Padgett of fraud, only that he might be sincerely mistaken.

  10. Stafford,
    Of course, we cannot prove who attempts to contact the physical world, which is why, unless it’s a message of a personal nature, we can only objectively consider the message, regardless of whether the purported communicator is famous or not. The message is arguably more important than the messenger.

    Should we discount A Course in Miracles because Schucman was told that the author was Jesus? Should we discount Neville Whymant’s book because the communicator claimed he was Confucius? Should we dismiss Victor Hugo’s writings because Jesus and Mohammed claimed to communicate?

    And what about the thousands of near-death experiencers who claim to encounter Jesus?

    And, of course, what about Swedenborg? What about Paul?

    Initially, Padgett didn’t believe it was Jesus at all and reportedly threw away messages. But because of personal evidence, he had come to believe that deceased family members and peers were communicating, and they in turn convinced him to take the messages seriously, particularly those from Jesus, along with those from presidents, queens, philosophers, etc.

    So my question is, should we shoot the messengers and reject the messages out of hand?

    We can see that the escalation in tensions between the US and Russia could result in a nuclear war. Both Trump and Putin profess to be Christians, and both have claimed that God is on their side.

    The common thread running through many of these afterlife messages is that certain Christian doctrines, in particular the ideas of vicarious atonement, original sin, just war, the rapture and eternal hell, are incorrect and are causing huge problems on our side and on theirs.

    So if that is the case (and I guess we won’t know until we get there), why wouldn’t Jesus, or any other historical figure, either directly or via proxies, try to steer us back onto the right path?

    What we can glean from the historical record is that Jesus existed and was a man with a mission who was executed by those who saw him as a threat.

    After he died, he reportedly communicated with a tentmaker from Tarsus, in what is now Turkey, who was transformed by the experience. We know him as Paul. That’s what we are told.

    If we are not open to Swedenborg, a polymath from Sweden, Schucman, a psychologist from New York, or Padgett, an attorney from Washington, DC, why should we accept Paul? Why should we believe that he was the last person to encounter the deceased Jesus?

    Neither Padgett nor Schucman were claiming authority. They were just sharing what they received. And who am I to judge? I have no idea who is communicating, if anyone, but I am interested in what they say, and I don’t really want to shoot the messengers.

    Even after death, it might not be straightforward. A number of Padgett’s communicators, mainly lawyers from Washington, DC, whom he knew, reported that they had met Jesus after they died but didn’t believe it was him, and they were struggling and asking for help but wouldn’t accept his.

    When you die, if you meet someone who identifies as Jesus, what would it take for you to believe that it’s him? And if you did accept that it was him, and could then report back to one of your loved ones still in the physical world, would you mention it? Stafford,
    Of course, we cannot prove who attempts to contact the physical world, which is why, unless it’s a message of a personal nature, we can only objectively consider the message, regardless of whether the purported communicator is famous or not. The message is arguably more important than the messenger.

    Should we discount A Course in Miracles because Schucman was told that the author was Jesus? Should we discount Neville Whymant’s book because the communicator claimed he was Confucius? Should we dismiss Victor Hugo’s writings because Jesus and Mohammed claimed to communicate?

    And what about the thousands of near-death experiencers who claim to encounter Jesus?

    And, of course, what about Swedenborg? What about Paul?

    Initially, Padgett didn’t believe it was Jesus at all and reportedly threw away messages. But because of personal evidence, he had come to believe that deceased family members and peers were communicating, and they in turn convinced him to take the messages seriously, particularly those from Jesus, along with those from presidents, queens, philosophers, etc.

    So my question is, should we shoot the messengers and reject the messages out of hand?

    We can see that the escalation in tensions between the US and Russia could result in a nuclear war. Both Trump and Putin profess to be Christians, and both have claimed that God is on their side.

    The common thread running through many of these afterlife messages is that certain Christian doctrines, in particular the ideas of vicarious atonement, original sin, just war, the rapture and eternal hell, are incorrect and are causing huge problems on our side and on theirs.

    So if that is the case (and I guess we won’t know until we get there), why wouldn’t Jesus, or any other historical figure, either directly or via proxies, try to steer us back onto the right path?

    What we can glean from the historical record is that Jesus existed and was a man with a mission who was executed by those who saw him as a threat.

    After he died, he reportedly communicated with a tentmaker from Tarsus, in what is now Turkey, who was transformed by the experience. We know him as Paul. That’s what we are told.

    If we are not open to Swedenborg, a polymath from Sweden, Schucman, a psychologist from New York, or Padgett, an attorney from Washington, DC, why should we accept Paul? Why should we believe that he was the last person to encounter the deceased Jesus?

    Neither Padgett nor Schucman were claiming authority. They were just sharing what they received. And who am I to judge? I have no idea who is communicating, if anyone, but I am interested in what they say, and I don’t really want to shoot the messengers.

    Even after death, it might not be straightforward. A number of Padgett’s communicators, mainly lawyers from Washington, DC, whom he knew, reported that they had met Jesus after they died but didn’t believe it was him, and they were struggling and asking for help.

    When you die, if you meet someone who identifies as Jesus, what would it take for you to believe that it’s him? And if you did accept that it was him, and could then report back to one of your loved ones still in the physical world, would you mention it?

  11. I don’t know what it would take. Thomas–“Doubting Thomas”– has always been my favorite apostle. My longest and best novel, The Severed Breast, tells the story of his trip to India to bring Hindus and Buddhists to the new faith. It changed him as much as it changed them. Thousands of men have claimed not only to have met Jesus but to be Jesus. I’ve never quite known what to make of him. Is he the kind of man who would use Padgett as a medium? In the last analysis it seems very unlikely. Like you, I favor the message that Padgett brought to the world. I just don’t want to give it more credence than it deserves.

  12. Stafford,
    Personally, I’m not an admirer of any particular medium, but I am interested in what they report.

    When you say, “Is he [Jesus] the kind of man who would use Padgett?” it opens up the question of why anyone wanting to get a message to the physical world chooses a particular person. In the case of Padgett, Leslie Stone wrote that Padgett was told he was chosen, not because of his morals, personality, faith in God, or anything of that nature, but because he could perform the task – in his case, through a form of automatic writing that allowed messages to be transmitted from “higher” levels to the physical world unimpeded (I’m paraphrasing).

    I’m not going to comment further on why those in Spirit choose certain people, other than to say that those who are receptive appear to be relatively few in number, so maybe they choose the person who can perform the task, whatever that task may be. There are mediums who read these blogs, and they may have a better answer.

    In Padgett’s case, the communicators weren’t coming through with “new revelations”; they were saying that many of Jesus’s original teachings have been corrupted or mistranslated. However, if understood the right way, the teachings in the Bible could “get you to Heaven.”

    One of the much-discussed beliefs among Spiritists, Buddhists, Hindus, OBErs, NDErs, hypnotherapists, and so on is reincarnation. Many people who read these accounts believe in reincarnation as a result.

    Personally, I’m open to the idea of reincarnation. I have no problem with it, and the accounts, particularly those in Stevenson’s research, are compelling. However, the people I cited who were told they were interacting with Jesus, namely Schucman, Padgett, and Swedenborg, were all told, albeit for different reasons, that reincarnation doesn’t exist. Swedenborg said, in so many words, that those having past-life memories were indeed having past-life memories, just not memories of their own past lives. Jesus, in the Padgett messages, said that a soul cannot inhabit more than one body, while Schucman’s Jesus said that reincarnation is ultimately impossible because time itself is an illusion, but added that belief might be useful because it opens up the idea of an eternal life.

    As we know, mainstream Christian doctrine rejects reincarnation, yet some of those who accept after-death communication while rejecting the possibility of Jesus communicating with anyone after Paul, accept reincarnation.
    Go figure. 🙂

  13. Yes, it is all quite confusing. But I’d trust the vast amount of empirical evidence that Stevenson brings to the question of reincarnation before Padgett or Swedenborg.

  14. In a 2015 interview Jim Tucker said: “There is this idea that the children, through some mechanism we don’t know, may have had access to this knowledge through what people might call ESP—also called psi or super-psi—meaning that they had access to these memories, this information, through clairvoyance or telepathy or some ability of the living. In other words, they interpret it as
    being memories from a past life, but it’s really access to memories that somebody else had.”

    Swedenborg was saying something similar. He wrote: “If a spirit were to speak from his own memory with a man the man would not know otherwise than that the thoughts then in his mind were his own, although they were the spirit’s thoughts.”

    That said, it doesn’t easily explain birthmarks and marks on the skin that correlate with the injuries that caused death, or the few cases where people remember being an animal in a past life.

    And even if a child is the reincarnation of the person whose life it’s remembering, it’s not easy to explain how the fatal injury turns up as a birthmark.

    And, of course, people who reportedly experience the stigmata of Jesus do not generally claim to have been Jesus in a previous life. My understanding is that they identify with his suffering and corresponding physical wounds reportedly appear, as if they are imprinted on the body. Could the children’s birthmarks be something similar? As I said before, I’m open to reincarnation and have no problem “coming back again” but it’s not the only explanation, and these days I’m less convinced.

  15. The greater problem for me has always been the very short afterlife intermissions reported by Stevenson and the much longer afterlives reported by countless spirits using mediums to describe their experiences. And the confident claims of reincarnation for all or most of us made by Jurgen Ziewe and many others. I lean toward belief but am far from certain.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *